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This research explores the role that collateral plays in sorting borrowers according to risk 
classes in the secured credit market.  Two distinct paradigms exist in the commercial loan 
market literature on risk-sorting based on collateral: (a) the sorting-by-observed-risk 
paradigm, which predicts a positive association between collateral and borrower risk; and 
(b) the sorting-by-private-information paradigm, which postulates a negative 
relationship.  We empirically test which of these paradigms explains the risk/interest rate 
dispersion in the market for collateralized Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs).   
Whereas for traditional loans the focus is on Loan-to-Value ratios, here we introduce the 
concept of Borrowing-to-Value ratio, which is the relevant criterion for lines of credit 
since credit extended is not necessarily borrowed.  Using a maximum likelihood 
procedure, we simultaneously estimate the HELOC borrowing level and the HELOC rate 
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1.  Introduction 
Collateral has always played an important role in commercial and real estate 
lending.  With the emerging importance of home equity lending, secured credit is also 
gaining ground in the consumer market for lines of credit.  The dispersion of interest rates 
in the secured credit market depends primarily on the role that collateral plays in sorting 
borrowers according to their riskiness.  In this regard, theoretical studies have predicted 
different roles for collateral in sorting equlibria of the secured credit market.  The two 
major explanations of the collateral-risk/interest rate connection are: (a) the sorting-by-
observed-risk paradigm whereby observably riskier borrowers are required to pledge 
more collateral than less risky borrowers; and (b) the sorting-by-private-information 
paradigm whereby low-risk borrowers signal their credit worthiness by pledging more 
collateral than their high-risk counterparts.  These opposing hypotheses have not been 
tested in the market for HELOCs.  Here we empirically investigate their validity in the 
market for collateralized HELOCs and find that the sorting-by-private-information 
paradigm dominates.  The higher the amount of collateral pledged, the lower is the rate 
of interest charged by banks for HELOCs.  Furthermore, we point out that the Loan-to-
Value (LTV) criterion often used by banks to price HELOC loans fails to take account of 
the main feature of a line of credit, namely that there is a difference between the loan 
extended and the actual amount borrowed.  Here we introduce the concept of the 
Borrowing-to-Value ratio (BTV), which is the appropriate measure of risk, and hence the 
relevant determinant of interest rates, in the market for secured lines of credit such as 
HELOCs. 
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Background and Previous Literature 
Although issues concerning the use of collateral have been explored in a variety 
of settings in the previous literature on the credit market, most of this work has focused 
on commercial loans.  This earlier work includes Barro (1976), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Scott (1977), Smith and Warner (1979), and Stulz and Johnson (1985).  An 
explanation for the secured lending arrangement which was not specifically addressed in 
this earlier literature is the sorting role of collateral in asymmetrically informed 
environments.  In the banking community, however, the use of collateral has been 
associated with observably riskier borrowers (Morsman, 1986).  This is referred to as the 
sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm.  Consistent with this view, Swary and Udell (1988) 
provided a motivation for the use of collateral by suggesting that secured debt may be 
useful in enforcing optimal firm closure (or bankruptcy).  Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) 
considered a model where the borrower’s risk type is observable to the lender while the 
borrower’s action is privately known, and they derived sufficient conditions under which 
observably riskier borrowers pledge more collateral in equilibrium.  Boot and Thakor 
(1994), using a model of multi-period loan contracts, have also found evidence in favor 
of this paradigm. 
  Another strand of the theoretical literature in the commercial loan market has 
focused on information about risk known only to borrowers, leading to the sorting-by-
private-information paradigm.  Besanko and Thakor (1987a) found that lenders are at an 
informational disadvantage with respect to borrower default probabilities, and in 
equilibrium, low-risk borrowers pledge more collateral than their high-risk counterparts.  
Besanko and Thakor (1987b) found a similar negative relationship between collateral and   4
borrower risk under loan contracting with a multi-dimensional pricing menu.  Chan and 
Kanatas (1985) and Bester (1985) found that low-risk borrowers pledge more collateral 
than high-risk borrowers because collateral-associated costs produce different marginal 
rates of substitution between collateral and interest rates.  Bester incorporated collateral 
as screening mechanism in the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) credit rationing model and 
showed that rationing then becomes unnecessary.  Chan and Thakor (1987) examined the 
form of the optimal secured loan contract assuming the existence of both adverse 
selection and moral hazard.  Igawa and Kanatas (1990), assuming moral hazard exists 
due to the use of collateral, showed that the optimal secured loan contract for higher 
quality borrowers involves over-collateralization; whereas self-financing and unsecured 
credit are chosen by the intermediate and lowest quality borrowers respectively.   
Empirical studies of collateral and risk based on bank files and survey data in the market 
for commercial loans include that of Orgler (1970), Hester (1979), and Berger and Udell 
(1990), who concluded that riskier borrowers pledge more collateral.  Berger and Udell 
(1995) found that collateral use decreases significantly with the length of the relationship 
with the bank, a fact that was theoretically explained in the earlier paper by Boot and 
Thakor (1994). 
  More recent theoretical work on the use of collateral in commercial loans 
has been put forward in a context of symmetric information with the existence of 
entrepreneurs’ overoptimistic evaluation of their project (de Meza and Southey, 1996) or 
costly state verification (Bester, 1994).   
Previous studies involving collateralization in the consumer loan market have 
largely focused on mortgage and auto loans.  Although recently the research on secured   5
consumer credit has expanded to include Home Equity Loans (HELs) and HELOCs, none 
of this work, to our knowledge, has addressed the issue of sorting by collateral (Chen and 
Jensen, 1985; Canner, Fergus and Luckett, 1988; DeMong and Lindgren, 1990; Eugeni, 
1993; Canner and Luckett, 1994; Eisenhauer, 1994; Delaney, 1994; Salandro and 
Harrison, 1997; Canner, Durkin, and Luckett, 1998; and Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and 
Moore, 2003).   
 
Loan-to-Value vs. Borrowing-to-Value 
 
Loan-to-Value ratio (LTV) has traditionally been a major explanatory variable in 
the assessment of the risk assumed by the banks and hence in the determination of the 
rate of interest.  For traditional loans, the amount of credit extended by a bank is actually 
borrowed; and therefore banks assume the risk of the entire loan amount provided to the 
borrower.  LTV (as opposed to the value of the collateral alone) should logically explain 
a significant portion of the risk/interest rate spread of in both the consumer and corporate 
secured credit market.  However, it is not appropriate to use LTV to explain the interest 
dispersion of collateralized lines of credit such as HELOCs.  A line of credit allows a 
consumer to borrow up to a predetermined credit limit.  Banks do not assume any risk 
unless the borrower, irrespective of his/her risk-type, borrows on the line.  Therefore the 
broader category of Borrowing-to-Value ratio (BTV), and not LTV, is the relevant 
measure of the risk assumed by banks in the case of lines of credit – a point which has 
been neglected in previous research.  Actual borrowing is typically not observed a priori 
by banks during the determination of their risk exposure, and hence the interest rate, for 
lines of credit.  However, banks can use their substantial information on consumer   6
borrowing patterns to make estimates of borrowing.  Such borrowing estimates, as well 
as the value of collateral pledged, should ideally be considered when setting the terms of 
the loan and loan-price dispersion for collateralized lines of credit such as HELOCs. 
In this paper, we empirically investigate of the relationship between the value of 
collateral and credit risk within the market for HELOCs.  The econometric model that we 
use estimates the borrowing of a household with the HELOC rate of interest as an 
endogenous variable.  The HELOC rate of interest is determined by the amount of the 
collateral pledged by borrowers, borrowers’ credit histories, and such characteristics of 
agreed secured loan contracts as the required frequency and rate of repayment.  We 
examine the nature of the information asymmetry that exists between borrowers and 
lenders in the HELOC market and explain how the value of collateral, along with 
estimated borrowing, helps to mitigate this information asymmetry.  Our empirical work 
supports a negative association between the value of the collateral pledged by borrowers 
and the HELOC rate of interest charged by banks, as opposed to the positive association 
typically found in the empirical literature on commercial loans. 
 
2.  Data 
The data set used in this study consists of a pooled sample from the 1995 and 
1998 rounds of the U.S. Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF).
1  We use data for the 
5,995 households who have positive equity in their homes.  There are two types of 
sample members: 
                                                           
1 All variables were converted to 1998 dollars.   7
Type I:  D
H = rH = 0, where D
H and rH are the observed HELOC debt and interest 
rate respectively. 
 
Type II:  D
H > 0 and rH > 0. 
 
The descriptive statistics for HELOC debtors and HELOC non-debtors in this data set are 
presented in Appendix A. 
 
3.  An Econometric Model 
  We will consider the following variables in our model: 
 
Definitions of Variables 
W – Wealth of the consumer  t – Income tax rate; 0 < t < 1 
C – Cost of collateralization
2  δ –Discount factor; 0 < δ < 1 
τ – Fixed cost
3 of HELOC; τ > 0  α – Required rate of repayment; 0 < α < 1 
 
Following Dey and Dunn (2004), the consumer’s discounted expected lifetime utility 
from optimally carrying Di
H* amount of HELOC debt is 
  V
H* = V
H(W, rH, δ, α, t, τ, c, Di
H*). 
Hence for household i we have, Di
H* = h (Wi, τi, ci, ti, rHi, αi, δi). 
 
Counterparts from the Data 
We will use the following empirical quantities to represent the variables of the model: 
Wealth Factors Wi: equity in the home, liquid assets, other non-financial assets, 
and household size. 
 
                                                           
2 These are perceived costs related to the risk of home-loss;, where  C = c (D
H), 1 > c > 0. 
3 This involves upfront costs such as appraisal fees, closing costs, and annual fees.   8
Risk Factors Ri: a dummy variable based on the incidence of delinquency, 
dummies capturing household’s attitude towards risk, and the repayment rate αi. 
 
Tax Factors Ti: a vector including a dummy variable which determines whether 
household i itemizes tax-deductions or not and household income.  
 
Mortgage Factors Mi: a vector including incidence of mortgage debt, debt 
repayment frequency, and mortgage rate of interest. 
 
Discount Factors Si: a vector including age, income, household size, ethnicity, 
and education level.  
 
Since the fixed costs of obtaining HELOCs (τi) have no variation across households, τi = 
τ ∀ i.  Therefore, the fixed costs go into the constant term of the HELOC debt equation.  
The marginal cost of collateralization ci is considered to be a function of the individual’s 
risk-type represented by Ri as given above.  The discount factor δi is captured by the 
vector Si.  The vector Ti as defined above captures the income tax rates ti.  Hence we have 
ci   = α0 + α1
′Ri  + ε1i, 
ti    = α2 + α3
′Ti + ε2i 
δi   = ϕi
′Si + ηi 
Substituting for ci, ti, δi and τi into Di




H* = γrHi + β1
′X1i + v1i       ( 1 )  
where X1i is a vector of exogenous variables influencing Di
H*. 
Using the amount of collateral pledged by household i, i.e. the home equity, Ri, and Mi, 
we have a reduced form equation for rHi, 
rHi = β2
′X2i + v2i          ( 2 )  
where X2i is a vector of exogenous variables influencing rHi.   9
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
  otherwise 
where v1i and v2i follow bivariate normal with zero means, variances σ1
2 and σ2
2 
respectively, and with covariance σ12.  If X2i contains at least one variable that is not 
included in X1i, then all the parameters of the model are identified.  The vector Mi 
contains information about the incidence of mortgage debt among households, mortgage 
rates of interest they face, and their debt repayment frequency.  Since all banks use the 
same credit bureau information to assess the risks of all loan applicants, the HELOC rate 
of interest should be correlated with the mortgage rate of interest.  However, after 
controlling for the HELOC rate of interest, the amount borrowed on the HELOC can 
reasonably be assumed not to depend on the mortgage rate of interest.  Hence we can 
logically include at least one variable in vector X2i, namely the mortgage interest rate, 
which is not included in vector X1i.  In order to correct for the endogeneity present in the 
HELOC debt equation, our two-stage estimation procedure uses an estimate of the 
HELOC rate of interest Hi r ˆ  as an instrument. 
We use a maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the econometric model.  A 
consumer is observed to carry debt on HELOC if 
Di
H* > 0. 
Substituting the HELOC interest rate equation into the HELOC debt function, the 
HELOC debt-holding decision can be written as   10
  β1
′X1i + γβ2
′X2i > - (v1i + γv2i) 
or, Ii > vi  
where, vi ∼ N (0, σ1
2 + γ
2σ2
2 + 2γσ12) ≡ N (0, σv
2). 
The likelihood of observing a HELOC non-debtor is 
) ( ) ( 1
2
1
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where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function.  Hence the likelihood of the 
data consisting of N observations, with N1 HELOC non-debtors is 
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where b (.) is the bivariate normal density function, n (.) is the normal density function 
and 
 v 1i = Di
H - β1
′X1i - γrHi 
  v2i = rHi - β2
′X2i. 
We know that v2i ~ N (0, σ2
2) 
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The corresponding log-likelihood function can be written as   11
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where φ(.) is the standard normal density function.   
A multi-step procedure was used to estimate the parameters of the model, first 
using the two-stage probit method as described in Lee et al. (1980).  This two-step 
procedure yields consistent estimates of all parameters, and these estimates were used as 
initial values for the final maximization of the log-likelihood function. 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
  The variables used in the empirical analysis are found in Table 1 below.  This is 
followed by Table 2 where the results for the maximum likelihood estimation for the 
HELOC rate of interest are presented.  The value of collateral (HOMEQUITY) has a 
significant negative influence on the HELOC rate of interest charged by banks. Therefore 
our maximum likelihood estimation provides empirical support for the sorting-by-
private-information  paradigm.  Borrowers who pledged higher amounts of collateral 
signal their superior risk-types and therefore are rewarded with lower interest rates by the 
banks.  Among HELOC debtors, those who carry mortgage debt (MORTGAGE = 1) get 
lower HELOC interest rates from banks.  The mortgage rate of interest 
(MORTGAGERATE) has a positive effect on HELOC interest rates, as expected from 
the discussion above.  Finally, we find empirical evidence of a positive association 
between the variable capturing repayment frequency (REPAYMENTFREQ) and the 
HELOC rate of interest. 
   12
  Table 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variables Explanation 
HELOCDEBT HELOC  debt 
HELOCRATE  HELOC rate of interest
a 
HOMEQUITY  Equity in home 
LIQUIDASSETS Liquid  assets 
OTHERASSETS Other  non-financial  assets 
TAX  1 – Itemize income tax deductions 
0 – Otherwise 
DELINQUENCY  1 –Behind in payments by two months or more 
0 – Otherwise 
INCOME Income 
REPAYMENTRATE  The required rate of repayment
b  
MORTGAGE  1 – Household has some kind of mortgage debt 
0 – Otherwise 
HIGH-RISKTAKER
c  1 – Above average risk-taker 
0 – Otherwise 
AVERAGE-RISKTAKER  1 – Average risk-taker 
0 – Otherwise 
NOT-RISKTAKER  1 – Not a risk-taker 
0 – Otherwise 
MORTGAGERATE Mortgage rate of interest
d  
AGE  Age of the household head 
EDUCATION  Years of schooling of the household head 
ETHNICITY  1 – Non-white 
0 – Otherwise 
HOUSEHOLDSIZE  Size of household 
REPAYMENTFREQ
e 
0 – No or flexible repayment required 
1 – Less frequent than monthly repayment required 
2 – Monthly repayment required 
3 – More frequent than monthly repayment required
 
a  Maximum interest rate charged among the different HELOCs taken out by the household. 
b  Fraction of HELOC and mortgage debt repaid. 
c  Household’s risk-tolerance on a 1 to 4 scale.
 
d  Maximum interest rate charged among the different mortgage loans taken out by the household. 
e  Maximum of the repayment frequency on HELOC and mortgage debt. 
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Table 2: Full Information Maximum Likelihood  















***               0.718
-0.0003
**          0.0001 
-0.014                0.316 
-0.537                0.532
0.505                  1.581 
3.788                  2.852 
-3.271
***              0.885 
0.46
***                 0.084
2.672
***               0.329 
 
*** Significant at 1% level; 
** Significant at 5% level; 
* Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the maximum likelihood estimation for HELOC debt.  The 
variables INCOME, OTHERASSETS, HOUSEHOLDSIZE, and HOMEQUITY are all 
significant with signs as expected.  Households with high tolerance for risk are found to 
hold greater amounts of HELOC debt, as are those who itemize their taxes, since this 
debt is tax-deductible.  The endogenous variable, the HELOC rate of interest, is found to 
depress HELOC debt-holding.  The only significant socioeconomic variable is AGE, with 
advancing age decreasing the amount of HELOC debt held. The maximum likelihood 
estimates of the error variances (σ1 and σ2) are both significant.  Finally, the estimate for 
ρ is found to be positive and significant. 
 
 
   14
       Table 3: Full Information Maximum Likelihood  


























-52.916            32.524
0.028
***               0.002 
0.003                  0.003 
-0.003
***            0.0003 
4.722
*                 2.631 
19.988
***             6.823 
-5.592                9.789
8.033                24.055 
-0.02
***                0.005 
16.013
*               8.957 
-37.318            40.908 
-1.93
***                0.282 
0.868                  1.602 
3.611                10.746 
-3.2
*                           1.8 
 
112.404
***              1.494 
2.476
***                  0.072 
0.182
***                  0.062 
 
-Log-L = -3751.253 
 
*** Significant at 1% level; 
** Significant at 5% level; 
* Significant at 10% level 
 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
  This paper has addressed the use of collateral in HELOCs.  We have explored the 
role that collateral plays in sorting borrowers by their risk-types, thereby explaining the 
observed spread of HELOC rates of interest.  The framework used here distinguishes 
between a line of credit and a loan.  While the full amount of a traditional loan is actually 
borrowed, with a line of credit, the amount of actual borrowing may be different from the 
amount of credit extended.  Therefore we proceed under the assumption that the actual or 
estimated borrowing amount is the relevant measure of the lender’s exposure to risk for a   15
line of credit.  We thus make a distinction between the Loan-to-Value ratio (LTV), which 
has traditionally been used as a measure of risk, and the Borrowing-to-Value ratio (BTV), 
which should be estimated when considering secured lines of credit such as HELOCs.  
Our econometric analysis has utilized an estimate of the HELOC borrowing, along with 
the value of the collateral pledged and the HELOC interest rate, in a simultaneous 
equations model which assumes a pricing scheme reflecting the concept of BTV. 
Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1995, 1998 data with a maximum likelihood 
procedure, we have estimated the level of HELOC debt as a function of relevant 
variables.  This includes the endogenous variable, the HELOC rate of interest, which is 
found to have a significant negative influence on HELCO debt.  We have also estimated 
the HELOC rate of interest as a function of home equity pledged as collateral and other 
exogenous variables.  Previous research has found the sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm 
to be empirically dominant in the secured commercial loan market.  However, in the 
market for HELOC loans, we find that relatively low-risk borrowers signal their risk type 
by pledging larger amounts of collateral and thereby receive lower interest rates, thus 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Means of Variables for HELOC Debtors 









































































* All monetary variables are in thousands of dollars. 